The 6 reactor Zaporizhia nuclear complex (‘Zap’) in Ukraine, which has been occupied by Russian troops since March, has come under repeated shellfire attack, sparking fears of a major nuclear accident. The main reactor buildings are relatively robust, but no one designs nuclear plants to resists concerted artillery fire. And although the spent fuel cooling ponds are protected in the main complex, the solid waste storage area is outside the main building and less unprotected. So there are risks, and given that grid links in, as well as out, are also vulnerable, power cut off is a key one. Then the reactor core and spent fuel cooling systems would have to rely on diesel back up pumps, and their fuel stocks may be limited. We could be headed for a Fukushima-like melt down situation.
Given terrifying prospects like this, and with lurid reports of possibly imminent disaster in the press, at the end of August, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi organized and fronted an IAEA-led international mission to conduct essential nuclear safety, security and safeguards activities at Ukraine’s nuclear sites, including Zaporizhia. It has now reported on what it found.
As it notes, Zap remains staffed by Ukrainian workers, but is under the control of Russian military forces. Key concerns documented in the IAEA report were shelling; intermittent periods of loss of important safeguards, including loss of off-site electric power; interruption of radiation monitoring; damage to spent fuel storage area; maintenance and supply issues; and worker stress and exhaustion.
It’s worth tracking through some of the impacts of the 12 or so shelling attacks that the IAEA reports on in a bit of detail: it certainly does not seem to have been just the odd isolated stray shot. The IAEA report notes that on August 5, shells hit the area of Zaporizhia’s nitrogen-oxygen station, initiating a fire which firefighters extinguished. It adds ‘On the same day, the IAEA was informed that there had been damage to external power supplies. Explosions near the electrical switchboard of a 750 kV external power supply line caused a transformer shutdown. On the following day, 6 August, renewed shelling caused further damage to the plant’s external power supply system, spent fuel facility, as well as communication cables that were part of its radiation control system.’ On August 6, shelling ‘damaged the spent fuel storage facility’s communication cables that were part of its radiation control system, with a possible impact on the functioning of three radiation detection sensors’.
There was more to come. On August 11, the plant’s fire station and domestic wastewater station were damaged by shelling and on August 13, the territory of the 750 kV outdoor switchgear for the Kakhovska line was shelled. On August 14, shelling hit the switchyard and electrical transformers and connectors of the 750 kV Kakhovska and South Donbas lines were destroyed. The shelling also damaged the 150 kV and 330 kV power lines that link ZNPP with the thermal power plant. On August 20, 21 & 22, shelling damaged ZNPP infrastructure including chemical and laboratory facilities and transitional galleries used by staff to access the power units (overpass). The August 22 shelling damaged the transformers of the nearby thermal power plant, causing a disconnection of the power line linking the thermal plant to the ZNPP lasting several hours. As of August 22, only 1 of the 4 power lines which connect the nuclear plant to the grid was operational.
It went on with yet more: on August 25, ZNPP lost power from its last remaining operational 750 kV external power line for a while, with power cable damage subsequently causing the radiation monitoring system at the site to be down for about 24 hours. On September 2, the sole remaining 750/330KV line sustained minor damage and needed repair.
That’s as far as the IAEA review went before it reported back, but in the period up to the start of Sept, the IAEA team clearly observed damage at many different locations including damage to the building that houses the fresh spent nuclear fuel and the solid radioactive waste storage facility. It said these attacks represented a ‘constant threat to nuclear safety and security because critical safety functions (containment of the radioactivity and cooling in particular) could be impacted’. And ‘the condition that the operating staff is subject to constant high stress and pressure while operating the NPP is not sustainable and could lead to increased human error with implications on nuclear safety.’
What it doesn’t say is whose fault it is- who done it! Although much of it may be implicit, with the IAEA complaining that Russia initially blocked access to them, there are conflicting accounts of what has been happening over the last few months - both sides blame the other for at least some of the shelling. Then we descend into propaganda territory and conspiracy theories. Many from the West will no doubt assume that it was mostly Russia (after all it did instigate the war), but the question then is how would it benefit from shelling Zap? Russia is, some say, using the site as a safe, retaliation-free, firebase, and even for storing shells there. So why would they attack it? But, the plant is (or was) also supplying power to Ukraine, so that might be a reason - also for possibly shelling the grid links, to deny Ukraine the power. Though the grid links have actually now mostly gone! But then again, it’s also possible that Ukrainian forces did it, perhaps accidentally or maybe so as to stop the Russians from using the power, and pressure them to leave the site. Or it might be to keep concerns for the plant (and the war) high on the international agenda, especially given that most in the West will believe it’s a Russian attack. But, a bit less tenuously, perhaps it was a Russian ‘false flag’ operation? Certainly it could be. Or even a Ukrainian one! Hard to say for certain, with claims and counter claims swirling around, and you can get lost in paranoia and associated fake news mongering, with some of it getting very bizarre.
However, whoever did it (and it might be both parties) it all feels very dangerous- and remains so. Although a grid link now seems to have been re-established after it got cut, enabling cooling while the last unit was shut down. So, with the reactors in cold shutdown it’s a bit safer now. Even so, the situation is still far from stable: there are still risks. And for many observers it is becoming increasingly clear that, in a unstable world, having nuclear plants anywhere is risky, in war zones especially. Crucially there’s the risk of ‘weaponisation’ of the plants by either or both sides- for example threatening attacks which could have major local impacts. At the very least, a weapons-free safety zone seems vital at this site, as the IAEA have suggested. But in the middle of a bitter war is that likely?
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