Renew Extra Weekly

The ‘politics of nuclear power’ was the title of one of the first books I wrote, back in 1978 , with inputs also from energy experts and fellow academics. The issues it raised have not gone away, and the development of nuclear power has been a regular topic for academic study and wider political commentary, much of both being from an anti-nuclear position.  I’m about to add a new tome to the pile- ‘Nuclear Power: Past, present and future’. Actually it is a second much expanded edition of the book I did for the Institute of Physics in 2017 .  In addition to still reviewing the past, it provides an update to the technical and policy developments since 2017- and there have been lots. However rather than just plugging this new book, in most of which I have tried to be politically neutral or at least not partisan, I thought that here I would take a look back historically at the political analysis side that I started addressing in 1978- and ask how did the political/academic debate unfold?  

Nuclear power is not popular with the public in most countries. After the Fukushima disaster in Japan in 2011, a global Ipsos survey put global public opposition at 62% averaged out, with it being much higher in some countries e.g. 79% in Germany.  94% voted against it in a referendum in Italy in the wake of Fukushima.  While opposition remain strong in most places around the world, with concerns about climate change rising, there have been some shifts in view in some countries, for example, in the USA , at least according to a survey by Bisconti . But even in countries that are relatively pro-nuclear, public support for it is not that strong. For example, it was reportedly at 38% in 2021 in the UK , compared to the 79% support level for renewables, with just 2% opposed to them.  Though its strength may have varied over time, opposition to civil nuclear power has been a world-wide phenomenon attracting people in many countries. To some extent, it grew out of opposition to nuclear weap

‘We are not going to be able to achieve our climate goals if nuclear power plants shut down. We have to find ways to keep them operating,’ US Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm said before a House Appropriations subcommittee. She added that the Department of Energy ‘has not historically subsidized plants, but this is a moment to consider to make sure we keep the current fleet active.’ To that end, President Biden’s Bipartisan Infrastructure deal included $6bn to establish a new Civil Nuclear Credit programme to help keep some of the existing reactor fleet of 93 reactors operating safely as long as technically possible. Owners or operators of commercial U.S. reactors can competitively apply for and bid on credits to help support their continued operations and avoid premature retirement due to financial hardship. Each credit will last for four years. Applicants must prove the reactor will close for economic reasons and demonstrate that closure will lead to a rise in emissions. They must

A detailed analysis for the UN Economic Commission for Europe of the full life-time green house gas emissions from energy generation has surprisingly concluded that nuclear has the lowest- around a global average of 5 gm CO2 equivalent/kWh, with, it says ‘most of the emissions occurring in the front-end processes’ i.e. extraction, conversion, enrichment of uranium and fuel fabrication. It goes on ‘This value is comparable to the lower range of literature values because of the following assumptions: revised energy inputs for mining and milling, including electricity inputs for ISL [In Situ Leaching], centrifugation-only enrichment, longer life-time assumed for nuclear power plant (60 years instead of 40)’.  60 years is pretty optimistic, as, arguably, are some of the other assumptions for nuclear, while it is quite pessimistic on renewables, all of which it calculates emit more CO2 /kWh. The differences are only small at the low end of the range quoted for renewables, but they open up