Ukrainian choices–gas, renewables or uranium?

Amongst many other things, the horrendous Russian invasion of Ukraine seems likely to change energy futures dramatically. Some of it will be about gas.  Ukraine has been a major transit state for much Russian gas and oil, but who knows what role it will play in future? Its intermediary role in EU gas supply was already an issue. Russia had tried to work around the transit problem with the Nord Stream 2 offshore pipeline, but Germany, in protest at the invasion, has now decided not to use it. Many other EU countries may now feel the same- no to Russian gas, whatever way it is delivered.   

However, many of these countries are heavily reliant on their gas imports from Russia, and reducing that will hard for some of them. It has even been suggested that, with Nord Steam 2 off, in addition to importing more LPG/LNG from elsewhere, Germany may have to delay its nuclear and/or coal phase out deadlines- the last nuclear plants are due to close this year and reliance on coal is set to end by 2030. Radical changes to that plan would be tragic, though they maybe not necessary if renewables can be expanded faster and energy demand managed more effectively. Despite the views of some gainsayers, Germany has arguably done well in this regard so far, so it may be able to cope.  

A major change to its widely-supported nuclear policy certainly seems unlikely, especially given the spectacle of the Russian military over-running the Chernobyl site on the way to Kyiv, kicking up some radioactive dust in the process. Even more worrying for us all was the attack on the 6-reactor Zaporizhzhia site in the South. That was a horrific reminder of how vulnerable nuclear plants can be during hostilities. 

Fortunately the shelling of the Zaporizhzhia site did not undermine the plants safe operation- most of the reactors had been shut down. But they still needed cooling, and the risk was still high- if the core cooling system had been damaged, or its power supplies interrupted, we could have ended up with a Fukushima-like fuel melt down and core release. And a direct hit on one of the sites spent fuel/nuclear waste stores could have led to the release of even more radioactive material. Europe was lucky…

What next? 

There are of course more nuclear plants in Ukraine, and who knows what comes next with Russian troops and armour moving across much of the country- bitterly opposed at almost every step.  At the same time, the various heavy economic and trade sanctions will begin to bite, hurting Russia, but also the West. For a nicely contrarian energy-related impact example, there have been US nuclear industry calls to exclude blocks on Russian exports of uranium - the US evidently needs it.  

Looking further on, some Eastern EU countries may now see nuclear as less worrying than Russian gas. That might also include Ukraine. It is hard to know what will happen next, but about a quarter of its power comes from old Russian nuclear plants, about a third from coal, most of the rest from Russian gas. It was thinking about expanding nuclear. That now seems unlikely (they could hardly use Russian technology), unless Russia wins the war.  Ukraine does have around 14 GW of renewables, including 7GW of solar, 1.4 GW of wind, and 6.3 GW of hydro, supplying all in about 22% of its power. It would be good to see that expand, rather than nuclear, and it certainly has done a bit better than Russia in that regard. But there is a long way to go.

Russia of course is focussed primarily on its fossil fuel reserves for internal use and lucrative export, but would like to see nuclear take over some of that- especially foreign sales of reactor systems.  It is also expanding renewables at long last (the wind resource is huge), if only from a very low level, but its main current plan is to invest $1.3bn in new nuclear, including Small Modular Reactors. It says that it wants to have 20% of the predicted global SMR market by 2030. But will anyone be willing to buy any technology from Russia now?  Well maybe- and energy as well. The EU’s use of Russian gas had already been falling, and now may fall further. Meantime, it seems that China has now agreed to take more of it. Pakistan too. So a market pivot to the East may be underway. 

Energy and global geo-politics are clearly forever intertwined. And they have now been shaken up, although with very little of this being good news for the climate or the environment  Yes, some countries may no longer use so much Russian gas, but others will take over as gas suppliers or as users.  As a result, net emissions may stay mostly unchanged, apart from hopefully some more use of renewables in some countries.  So, predictably, while some might have hoped that a big energy shock could open up good options, so far there seems little positive to say about the impact of the invasion- in addition to the horrors of war and the shelling of civilians, with no doubt more yet to come, it will push up energy prices and may set progressive energy developments back years. Though it is still possible that, once the dust has settled, sense will prevail, given the ever-clearer economic attractions of renewables. Putin has dismissed wind and solar as irrelevant in the past, in preference to fossil and fissile fuel, but, leaving aside whatever happens with his war on Ukraine, he may have backed a loser in the longer-term energy war.