Nuclear opposition- and academia

The ‘politics of nuclear power’ was the title of one of the first books I wrote, back in 1978, with inputs also from energy experts and fellow academics. The issues it raised have not gone away, and the development of nuclear power has been a regular topic for academic study and wider political commentary, much of both being from an anti-nuclear position. 

I’m about to add a new tome to the pile- ‘Nuclear Power: Past, present and future’. Actually it is a second much expanded edition of the book I did for the Institute of Physics in 2017.  In addition to still reviewing the past, it provides an update to the technical and policy developments since 2017- and there have been lots. However rather than just plugging this new book, in most of which I have tried to be politically neutral or at least not partisan, I thought that here I would take a look back historically at the political analysis side that I started addressing in 1978- and ask how did the political/academic debate unfold?  

The academic (and political) popularity of the topic is not surprising, given that nuclear power has been one of the defining technologies of the modern post second world war era. First on the scene, in the 1970s, were various radical analysts, myself included, who approached the topic from a variety of left political perspectives, ranging from Marxist to anarcho-libertarian and eco-socialist. 

On the basis of the traditional technological determinist view, shared by many Marxists, nuclear technology, having been shaped by capitalist social and economic relations, was clearly bad, but might, it was sometimes claimed, be reshaped to meet other social ends in and by a new socialist society. The lived experience of Soviet reality (and Chernobyl) may have dented that belief, though some might say that was ‘not a proper test’- nuclear could be made safe in a fully socialised and democratised economy. 

Be that as it may, those sharing an anarcho-libertarian view had no problem in attacking Soviet or any other state-led technological development. Nuclear power was seen as the epitome of technocratic state centralism, its inherent need for security providing a rationale for increasingly autocratic social and economic management- the nuclear state. 

In the post-Cold War neo-con era less was heard of this type of analysis, with the rise of modern corporate economism leaving little room for anything other than pragmatic optimalisation of investment gains. But belief in the benefits of that approach has now waned, while climate and environmental concerns have risen. Given the growth of green/eco-socialists views, more critical views and analysis in relation to nuclear may again emerge.      

A first step in that process could involve dismantling the view that nuclear power is an investment asset. That certainly has been done for investment in coal and also oil. It will of course be resisted strongly. Interestingly, as I noted in a recent post, Barclays have mounted a counter attack arguing that new nuclear offers a better investment option than renewables- real bankable assets. 

Technical expertise is also a bankable asset of sorts, although more complex and fluid.  However, there are undoubted links between civil and military nuclear technology, including in relation to shared expertise. That link may be one of the stronger explanations of why (civil) nuclear power is being supported to have emerged from academia in recent years. It should certainly appeal to anti-state centralists and pacifists, but I worry about the risk that it will become a single issue campaign, worthily seeking to cut the mutual support links between civil and military nuclear, but not changing the trajectory of either very much. 

That said, the issue of civil-military nuclear links are hard to avoid- and not just in terms of the current dire example of Russian military vehicles churning up radioactive dust as they push through the Chernobyl site in the north of Ukraine, on their way to Kyiv. That is a little worrying, as is the likely fate of nuclear plants during wars. But on a wider canvas, concerns about the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons making capacity, and access to nuclear materials, are even more worrying and have had a significant impact on the development of nuclear technology. For example, they were one reason for opposition to plutonium breeder reactors. 

The weapons link opens up some major issues, many of them very controversial. For example, do we want nuclear weapons? The big one...  More practically, how can we prevent proliferation? Some think that it is possible to maintain a secure and reliable separation between military and civil nuclear activities, but not everyone is convinced that this is the case, or that it can be achieved if the use of civil nuclear technology spreads more widely. 

The debate on that can become quite polarised. While on one side it is often argued that you do not need nuclear plants to make nuclear bombs, it is counter-claimed that it is easier to do so in countries with civil nuclear expertise and capacity. Some have even seen that interplay as a good thing, not a problem. For example, in effect inverting the old US ‘Atoms for Peace’ idea, well-known US pro-nuclear lobbyist Michael Shellenberger has argued, in support of increasing the spread of nuclear plants, that having civil nuclear allows a country to say they could have nuclear weapons- so that it has latent deterrence capacity and increased potential national security. Perhaps understandably, that did not go down well with those of an anti-nuclear persuasion. It certainly moves us beyond a simple version of the energy debate. 

However, underlying all this is still the question of energy assets. What real use is nuclear in countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia, blessed with very high solar potential? Unless there are other attractions than just energy, it seems an expensive, ineffective and foolish way to go.

Part of the problem is that renewable energy systems are still not seen as major economic, environmental and social assets. That will hopefully change, as the costs of not developing them fast mount, including the full costs of going nuclear. But it may take time. So what can academics do- if they want to help change things?  

Education and outreach work may have limited impact, often only servicing those who have already been convinced. In which case, it is not surprising that the focus for anti-nuclear activists and academics has in the past usually been on specific new nuclear projects. However, with nuclear stalled or in decline many places globally, there are now fewer new projects. 

So concerned academics and activists may be just left with lobbying work, to shift policy priorities, as in the case the EU’s new Sustainable Investment Taxonomy. Or they can write books, like the one I’m working on now. That I feel may be valid  partly since, despite the case for renewables now being overwhelming, nuclear hasn’t gone fully away. Indeed it’s still alive and kicking in some countries. Though I have to say I’d much prefer to get back to writing pro-renewables books - and blogs. A much more positive topic and life affirming activity.