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The Long goodbye to fossil fuel

A new Palgrave Handbook, edited by Geoff Wood and Keith Baker, on how to manage the decline of fossil fuel use, says that there is a paradox in the global energy transition as it has occurred so far. We have had growth in renewables and low carbon energy sources, but no concomitant decline in overall fossil fuel use: ‘Simply put, there needs to be a decoupling of fossil fuels and renewable/low carbon energy; the latter cannot just simply pick up the slack of increasing demand or serve difficult to reach places. Unaddressed and unresolved, all this will do is serve to bloat the energy system with the same problems for issues such as climate change and energy security’.

It notes that, although renewables are expected to continue to be the fastest growing energy source, the global fossil fuel share will remain more-or-less constant. Indeed  BP has said that fossil fuels will continue to gain market share to 2030 on the back of increasing energy demand, albeit at different speeds: oil (0.8%), coal (1.2%) and gas (2%) per year, with overall growth in part due to strong growth in production from unconventional gas and oil.

Limits to growth

Well yes, but the main underlying reason is that, globally, we have had continued growth in energy use, fuelled by economic growth. So renewables may have expanded, but so has energy demand/use and the overall renewables percentage share barely rises. Some say we need to cut demand and maybe even halt growth - except for renewables! Though stabilising growth would have big social equity implications. I have been working on a book on issues like that. What is interesting is that, although renewable growth had reduced from the results quoted in REN21’s 2018 Renewables Status report, the 2019 edition says that, as a percentage of total energy consumption, modern renewables have still expanded by an average of 4.5% over the last ten years, whereas global energy demand had only risen by 1.5%. So they are still doing quite well. Indeed very well in absolute term: as a recent Forbes article noted, wind and solar power output, ‘grew at an annual average of 20.8% and 50.2%, respectively, over the past decade’.

However, fossil fuel use is also growing, and, despite the emergence of policies for phasing out coal in some countries (including the UK), globally it is going to be a long goodbye- even looking optimistically, we will be stuck with fossil use for some while. The Wood and Baker book assembles extensive analysis of the implications of that and looks at the options for reducing impacts. In my chapter, I look critically at the idea of using carbon capture and storage (CCS) to deal with the emissions. No spoilers, but no, I don’t think we should go very far down that route, or try for negative emissions technology. With a few exceptions, they look like expensive diversions from getting on with renewables, although some of the better ideas might have to be used to limit emissions, since some fossil fuel will be needed to build the renewable energy-based system.

What about nuclear?  In his chapter Paul Dorfman from University College London does not see it as offering a viable future. He concludes by saying, in bidding a long goodbye to coal, we may also be bidding adieu to nuclear - and given the associated ramping cost and risk issues that cling to nuclear power, perhaps not before time’.

Global fossil phase out

That leaves us with looking to renewables and improved efficiency as the main ways ahead, but with a relatively long period while fossil fuel will continue to be used extensively, though being phased out.  The book looks at how that is being handled around the world. For example, there is a useful Chapter on China, which concludes that, despite progress on renewables and the urgent need to deal with air pollution and the longer term threat of climate change, with CCS being slow to develop, ‘the absolute reduction in the use of fossil fuels in China is likely to be a long process relying on sustained policy pressure from the government in support of alternative forms of energy’. It’s the same in India, Africa and even, sadly, Australia, as chapters on each indicate, with the slow progress in these countries often being buttressed by ‘lock in’ to fossil fossil use or export.

That is even clearer in the case of Russia, which, judging by the interesting chapter on its approach, seems to be aggressively defensive of its national fossil fuel inheritance and also somewhat dismissive of climate change. However, it is keen on cleaning up and improving the efficiency of use of fossil fuels. It is also aware that we are shifting from a period when what worried people was the threat of peak supply capacity (‘peak oil’), to one where demand might peak and fall, for a variety of reasons, including costs but also climate change policy. Indeed, the Russian chapter offers what might stand as a good summary of the overall conclusion of the book: Some countries will see the shift to the low-carbon future as a loss of their existing international competitive advantages. Others will see it, in contrast, as an opportunity to gain new competitive advantages by creating new national competences…and to grasp/win new competitive niches in the new growing…innovative markets being developed with the transition of the global economy to the low-carbon development path’.

Russia seems to be in the first category, and may need time to change. As some of the case studies in this book indicate, while there are some winners, that could also be true of other countries.  However, while, as the final chapters make clear, issues of social equity will have to be faced in the ‘Just Transition’, there does not seem to be an alternative but to change. Competition may not be the best mechanism for speeding change, but as US President Barak Obama once said ‘The country that harnesses the power of the clean, renewable energy will lead the 21st century’.


The US seems to have forgotten that, China may not have. And as for Scotland, which is where the the editors of this book are based, as they indicate, it’s evidently a mixed story of success, on green power (it’s nearing 75%) and short termism (less movement so far on green heat). Still some way to go then, with attention to energy efficiency in all sectors being a key gap there and everywhere else. We have to get demand under control so that renewables can replace fossil fuel and nuclear. Can it be done? The race is on!

Comments

  1. Hi, wondering who authors posts on this blog? And if we can have permission to reprint 'The long goodbye' in the WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor? jim.green@foe.org.au

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